В края на селото по Дерида

Чакали
плачат върху понятието
за животно

 

Ноемврийско утро

 

От гнездо

на щъркел  излитнаха

врабци

 

Faced with the hyper-historicity of experience, postmodern ideology hurries to play the broken record of the déjà vu, simultaneously both sweet and gloomy. Everything has already been; history has fallen “into the order of the recyclable”; we are destined, for better or for worse, to “the massive recall, at every moment, of all the patterns of our life”; every action has the status and the mannerisms of a quotation.

Паоло Вирно

 

Милнер will advance that sexuality, inasmuch as psychoanalysis speaks of it, is nothing other than this: the place of infinite contingency in the body.
That there is sexuation, rather than not, is contingent. That there are two
sexes rather than one or many is contingent. That one is on one side or
the other is contingent. That such somatic characteristics are attached to
a sexuation is contingent. That such cultural characteristics are attached
to it is contingent. Because it is contingent, it touches infinity.

It is curious that if one looks at the world’s biggest corporations these days, a lot of their power and property is in vectoral form. Many of them don’t actually make the things they sell. They control the production process by owning and controlling the information. Even when they do still make the stuff, a quite remarkable amount of the valuation of the company comes from portfolios of intellectual property, or proprietary data about their customers, and so on. Capital was subsumed under a more abstract form of technical power.
When considering the vectoralist class, then, three further points suggest themselves. First, it seems to be able to extract value not just from labor but from what Tiziana Terranova calls free labor. Even when you just stroll down the street, the phone in your purse or pocket is reporting data back to some vectoralist entity. The vectoralist class seems to be able to extract revenue out of qualitative information in much the same way as banks extract it out of quantitative information. Perhaps the exercise of power through control of quantitative and qualitative information is characteristic of the same ruling class.
Second, the vectoralist class subordinates the old kind of ruling class, a capitalist class, in the same way that capitalists subordinated the old landlord class that subjected rural production to commodification through ground rent. In that sense, the rise of a vectoralist class is a similar and subsequent development within intra-ruling class dynamics. The vectoralist class still sits atop a pyramid of exploited labor, but it depends also on extracting a surplus out of another, fairly privileged but still subordinate class.
I call it the hacker class. Bernal already had an inkling of this development when he tried to articulate the interests of scientific workers in and against capitalism, but this was not quite the hacker class yet. That had to wait for the development of sophisticated forms of intellectual property, which are in turn embedded in the design of the interface for the creative process. This transforms the qualitative work of producing new forms of information in the world into property that can be rendered equivalent in the market. In short, a new class dynamic, between vectoralist and hacker, was added to an already complex pattern of relations between dominant and subordinate classes.
Third, the political economy of the former West rather than the former East was the one that was able to develop the implications of the scientific and technical revolution, in the form of the rise of the vectoralist class. But it was the state form of the former East that has prevailed in the former West. The vector is not just a means of transforming production. It is also a way of transforming state power. Data can be collected for the purposes of a logistics of economic control; data can also be collected to run the surveillance and security apparatus of the state. The western states too had their surveillance apparatus, but it was never as total as those of the East. The new model worldwide uses the vector to realize the dreams of the KGB of old, an information state. This is what Guy Debord called the stage of the integrated spectacle, combining the worst of the former East and West.
The West is now the former West. Its economy became something else. It isn’t capitalism any more—it’s worse. It takes even more control away from work life and everyday life. It expands the exploitation of nature to possible extinction. It is certainly not the wonderful dream of a “postindustrial society,” still less Bernal and Richta’s accelerationist socialism. It is a relatively new and more elaborate form of class domination, one in more or less “peaceful coexistence” with the Russian former East, whose global significance is reduced to that of predatory oligarchy monopolizing a resource export economy. The Soviet Union paid a high price for not figuring out the role of information and reaching a modus vivendi with its scientific workers.

capital-is-dead-is-this-something-worse
mckenzie-wark

 

Понятие «гувернаментальность» (Governmentality ) предполагает концептуальный сдвиг по отношению к распространенным в политической философии концепциям власти, понимающим «власть» через «государство» (власть как результат договора, власть как институционализированное насилие—с опорой на понятия суверенитета, легальности/легитимности власти и т. д.). Даже когда речь идет о нововременных формах гувернаментальности (нововременных гувернаментальностях), связанных с современным государством, их нельзя понимать как формы «государственного управления» (или «правительственного управления»)—государство не является субъектом гувернаментальности. «Правительство» как субъект государственной воли, «правительственная ментальность», «государственное управление» и т.п.—использование в переводе таких понятий и фигур мысли для передачи gouvernementalité полностью уничтожает фукианскую аналитическую перспективу
Понятие «гувернаментальность» отсылает к общей фукианской концепции власти, предлагающей понимать «власть» как отношения, в которых индивиды (или группы) воздействуют на поле возможных действий друг друга, одновременно управляя самими собой. Таким образом, оно предлагает понимать отношения власти в максимально широком смысле слова (выходящем далеко за пределы сферы «политического» или, если угодно, расширяющем сферу «политического» далеко за пределы того, что было принято считать таковой в нововременной традиции политической мысли). Анализ гувернаментальности(ей) представляет собой анализ способов руководства поведением внутри самого разного типа институтов и/или социальных связей (где руководство поведением может осуществляться как с помощью, так и без помощи инструментов государства): в отношениях между супругами и членами семьи в рамках института брака разного типа, между врачами и пациентами, между учителями и учениками, между психиатрами и душевнобольными и т. д. Речь может идти в том числе о культурах, где институт государства просто отсутствует.

Виктор Каплун
http://www.logosjournal.ru

Думаю, последний автор, которого я довольно внимательно читал,—это Богданов; после него я вряд ли кого-то знаю хорошо. Но я знаю Сталина, я читал его—и даже книжку написал. Мне кажется, что и у Сталина, и у многих марксистов были такие формулировки: западный марксизм отличается от русского марксизма тем, что в западном марксизме диалектический материализм подчинен и продолжает подчиняться историческому материализму. А в советском марксизме исторический материализм подчинен и продолжает подчиняться диалектическому материализму. Иначе говоря, интересным аспектом для меня здесь являются космизм и материализм. Я не знаю, читали ли вы Квентина Мейясу, но это в чистом виде Сталин. Ленинская критика Богданова, которую я помню очень хорошо, и ранний Сталин—начало у него примерно такое же, когда он пишет, что, если следовать Канту, выходит, что динозавры получились после людей. Но мы же этому не верим: динозавры появились раньше. И это означает, что материалистический диалектический процесс протекает до возникновения сознания. Мне кажется, что если говорить о моде, то моден не акселерационизм, но комбинация Бруно Латура и спекулятивного реализма. Имя Мейясу все знают, но никто его не читает, потому что он пишет довольно сложно. Хармана—читают, Деланду—читают. Комбинация американского извода спекулятивного реализма с Бруно Латуром—то, что тотально интересует молодежь. Если вы послушаете, что они говорят, то будет очень похоже на русский диалектический материализм 1930-х годов. Это интеграция или реинтеграция исторических процессов в движение материальных сил, в движение космических энергий, даже просто в хаотические процессы. Люди точно в это верят. Мне достаточно посмотреть на своих студентов или на коллег, чтобы понять, как произошел переход к «Краткому курсу ВКП(б)». Когда я приехал туда, я знал слово «деконструкция»—и больше ни одного. Единственное слово, которое теперь все знают, — это «антропоцен». То есть существование человека как фактор материального развития земли и космоса, почвы. Это совершенно доминирует; это везде, куда ни плюнь. И только на это можно получить финансирование. Если вы хотите получить деньги—а мы всегда хотим получить деньги, — то, когда пишете заявку на грант (а это, собственно говоря, единственный философский текст и есть), вы должны сослаться на Бруно Латура, Мейясу и Хармана и сказать, что вы будете изучать тот или иной аспект антропоцена. Тогда вы их получите. А если не напишете—ничего не получится.

БОРИС ГРОЙС
http://www.logosjournal.ru

 

Что вообще значит «художник»? Лучшее определение художника дал Ницше, когда у него спросили, для кого он пишет. Он сказал: «Для всех и ни для кого». И так пишет каждый человек сегодня: любой, который пишет в твиттере или фейсбуке, не имеет адресата. Он пишет для всех и ни для кого. Он заранее согласен на то, чтобы его прочли все—и никто. Это характерная черта нашего времени—безадресность существования, безадресность любой формы деятельности. Мы не знаем, кому и зачем нужно то, что мы делаем. Это как-то все выбрасывается в пустоту в надежде на то, что кто-нибудь когда-нибудь поймает. Это словно сигналы радиотелескопов, посылаемые в расчете на то, что где-то там есть внеземные цивилизации. На самом деле это модель существования человечества самого по себе, в пределах Земли. Я же много преподаю в разных местах: в Нью-Йорке, даже на Тайване, в Аргентине, в Буэнос-Айресе. И что меня поразило? Когда спрашиваешь студентов, принадлежащих к одному поколению, чего они хотят, — они хотят вирусных видео. Разместить одно такое видео, которое увидели бы все. Мои студенты в Нью-Йорке выяснили, какие видео вирусные. На первом месте —видео о кошках, на втором—о собаках. А дальше идут все остальные. Как было сказано, что с кошками и собаками никакой актер состязаться не может, так эта истина и осталась непоколебимой для интернета.
БОРИС ГРОЙС
http://www.logosjournal.ru

Relying on Marx’s notion of the imbalance in the
contract between worker and capitalist where the two are formally
equal, Jean-Claude Milner recently outlined the objective and structural weakness.
Even if, in the labor contract, the
worker is paid its full value, the exchange between worker and capitalist
is not equal, there is exploitation since the worker is a commodity which
produces surplus- value, i.e., more value than its own value. In this
sense, the contract is unjust, the worker is in a weaker structural
position even if it is “objectively” stronger, with more empirical social
power.
According to Milner, the MeToo movement implicitly transposes
the same logic on the sexual exchange between a man and a woman:
even if they formally agree to make love as equal partners, i.e., even if
the appearance is that of an equal exchange of sexual favours, there is
a structural equality and the woman is in the weaker position. As with
the contract between worker and capitalist, one should emphasize the
structural (formal) character of this weakness: even if the woman
initiated sexual exchange, even if she is socially or financially much
stronger, she is structurally weaker.
Therein resides the lesson of the
Harvey Weinstein scandal: if by “rape” we understand an enforced
sexual exchange, then every (hetero)sexual act is ultimately a case of
rape. It goes without saying that very few actual MeToo members are
ready to spell out this radical implication (which was already theorized
years ago by some radical feminists like Andrea Dworkin and Catherine
McKinnon): the large majority are not ready to claim that a sexual act
is as such an act of masculine violence, and they proclaim as their
goal only the struggle for sexuality which does not rely on a male
position of power and brings true joy to both partners. However, the
implication that the sexual act is ultimately as such an act of rape, of
violent imposition and coercion, clearly functions as the unspoken
presupposition of the MeToo movement with its focus on cases of male
coercion and violence—its partisans treat men exclusively as potential
rapists, and women as potential victims of male power.
Milner further deploys how Donald Trump is the exact opposite
of MeToo: MeToo privileges structural weakness at the expense of
objective weakness, Trump ignores structural weakness and focuses
exclusively on objective weakness and power—for him, politics is
basically an immoral game of power in which all principles can be (and
should be) ignored or turned against themselves when circumstances
(e.g., “America first” interests) demand it. One demonizes Kim Yong- un
as a threat to humanity, then one treats him as a friend, etc. etc., up to
the ultimate example of separating children of illegal immigrants from
their parents—in Trump’s immoral universe, it is totally logical to attack
the weak opponent at its weakest point (children). As Milner concludes,
Trump is the Weinstein of the US politics.
However, this symmetry also signals the fateful limitation and
even ethically problematic implications of the MeToo movement. Its
exclusive focus on structural weakness enables it to play its own power
game, ruthlessly using structural weakness as a means of its own
empowerment. When a person in the structural position of power is
accused of mistreating a person in the weak structural position, all the
facts which clearly prove that the structurally “weak” person has strong
institutional positions, that her accusations are very problematic if not
outright false, etc., are dismissed as ultimately irrelevant. This doesn’t
happen only in the sexual domain—to give an example that happened
to me: if, in an academic debate, I make some critical remarks about,
say, a black lesbian, replying to her critical remarks about me, I am more
or less automatically suspected at least of acting as a white homophobic
supremacist and am at least guilty of racial and sexual insensitivity. Her
position of structural weakness gives her the power and my structural
position as a white male effectively makes me powerless.
We thus enter a cruel world of brutal power games masked as a
noble struggle of victims against oppression. One should recall here
Oscar Wilde’s saying: “Everything in life is about sex, except sex. Sex is
about power.” Some partisans of MeToo talk about sex, but their
position of enunciation is that of power (and of those who don’t have it,
of course)—following Wilde, they reduce sex to a power game, and
what they exclude (from their position of enunciation) is precisely and
simply sex. Their goal is to keep men, independently of their qualities
formally reduced to oppressors, constantly under threat: be careful
what you do, we can destroy you at any moment even if you think you
did nothing wrong . . . The spirit is here that of revenge, not of healing.
In this cruel world, there is no space for love—no wonder love is rarely
mentioned when MeToo partisans talk about sex.
This formal guilt of a masculine subject, independent of any of his
acts in reality, is the only way to account for the fact that, when a man
is accused of sexual violence by radical feminists, his defence is as a
rule dismissed as hypocritical or outright irrelevant—the old judicial rule
“innocent until proven guilty” is here suspended or, rather, replaced by
its opposite, “guilty until proven innocent.” One is a priori considered
guilty, so that one is obliged to work hard to introduce some doubt into
the accusation. The message is: “Don’t bother with facts, you are a
priori guilty, so repent and maybe you have a chance, since we can
easily destroy you if we want!”

 

Sex and the Failed Absolute
Slavoj Žižek

The social relations of contemporary capitalism are perceived, as in pre-capitalist social formations, as relations of personal dependence, subordination and domination; the social causes of these relations appear masked in the phantasies of personal values, personal excellence or deficiency, personal merits or faults, and so on. Social tensions that necessarily arise from these same relations are ultimately experienced as interpersonal conflicts. In short, Močnik writes, ‘The class struggle assumes in the eyes of those involved the fantastic form of personal intrigues.’ The more these individuals perceive their social position in terms of their personal biography, or the success or failure of their ‘career’, and experience their relations to their fellow men and women through competition struggles and mutual exclusions, the more they blindly support and reproduce the structure of capitalist domination.
This is, according to Močnik, the mechanism behind the processes that we perceive today, in their existential immediacy, as a re-feudalization of social relations. It comes to light in the entire sphere of civil society, where any element of the individual lifeworld, from lifestyle or entertainment to family relations – elements that were originally of no interest to the state – now might turn into an ideological apparatus of the capitalist state, having huge impact on the political life of society.

In fact, the overall social, historical and cultural ground on which this new interest in Marx occurs is increasingly narrowing. It is shrinking together with the light of the central sun of freedom, the figure of the free and equal individual that has been for the last two centuries illuminating the worlds revolving around it. The more the sun cools down, ever-larger parts of its system are swallowed by the new vernacular darkness. And while here, around the dimming light of an old, tired and ever-weaker freedom, Capital is well preserved, lovingly taken care of and seriously discussed and studied – as is right and proper for such a valuable and long-canonized piece of the world’s cultural heritage – there in the darkness people don’t give a damn about the book. Rather, they get buried again with their holy Bibles, Qurans or Torahs, with their reconsecrated national myths, or the masterpieces of post-truth trash. But if it is true that they have abandoned Marx, it is even more true that Marx has abandoned them. He no longer talks to them in their new vernaculars – the languages of the decaying post-translational societies that have become slow to catch up with the acceleration of technological development, global trade, finance and politics; that increasingly lose the capacity to convey the complexity of the contemporary world and to critically reflect upon its contradictions, dangers and chances; that have scrapped the ideas of enlightenment – which once raised them into the spheres of secular universality, natural and human sciences, culture, the rule of law and political freedoms – to replace them with the neo-medieval ‘values’ of servitude, ignorance and superstition; that have sunk into their own ahistorical temporalities, without any relation to a common history, the languages of those who were liberated from Marx only to be left behind by global capitalism. They have accumulated an enormous capacity for political mobilization, but it is today increasingly activated for the interests of domination and exploitation. It is from this ever broadening and deepening vernacular darkness that contemporary capitalism draws today the ideological energy for its ongoing reproduction. At stake is a metabolism between the neoliberal economy and neo-medieval social relations, a kind of ideological accumulation of the capitalism of our age.

Boris Buden