Медея

Еще более суровую концовку можно написать, обратившись к фигуре чужака, иностранца. В этом финале мы увидим Медею — колдунью, внучку бога солнца Гелиоса и жену героя Ясона. В «Медее» Еврипида Ясон бросает ее, и она мстит за свою потерю, убивая детей Ясона и его новую жену. С самыми существенными моментами этой истории нас знакомит рекламный плакат фильма Пазолини «Медея»[22]: «Это фильм о женщине, которая обезглавила своего брата, зарезала своих детей и сожгла жену своего любовника. Для Марии Каллас это естественно».

На строго научном уровне мы имеем дело с «гипотезой Медеи», призванной опровергнуть гипотезу Геи Лавлока. Как предположил палеонтолог Питер Уорд, многоклеточная жизнь — это дети Земли, которые регулярно уничтожаются в ходе запускаемых микробами процессов массовых вымираний. Так что даже если Земля — мать жизни, она же ее периодически и убивает. Он приводит доказательства массовых вымираний (исключая мел-палеогеновое, которое связывают с последствиями падения метеорита), среди которых: отравление метаном, кислородная катастрофа, глобальное похолодание и триасово-юрское сероводородное вымирание [Ward 2009]. Двоякая трактовка Земли как матери и убийцы позволяет внести важную символическую коррективу, подрывая привычные рассказы о мире, гармонии, балансе и взаимосвязи. Но, как и в случае с большинством научных теорий, заимствующих основополагающие компоненты из метафор, сами эти метафоры могут быть расширены лишь до известных пределов, после чего становятся бесполезными. Вывод Уорда весьма тривиален: «…сейчас нас способна спасти лишь инженерия» [Ibid.: 156].

Возможно, трагедия Медеи уже разыгрывается. Писатель Рой Скрэнтон заявил, что главная проблема, которую ставит перед нами изменение климата, заключается «не в том, как Министерству обороны планировать ресурсные войны, и не в том, как создать волноломы для защиты Манхэттена, или когда нам следует покинуть Майами» [Scranton 2015: 23]. Мы, скорее, сталкиваемся с куда большей проблемой, имеющей философский характер: «осознанием того, что эта цивилизация уже мертва» [Ibid.]. Скрэнтон отвечает на этот философский вызов в духе Симоны Вейль, когда та предлагает нам изменить взгляд на мир при столкновении с фактом своей смертности, — именно этому он научился, будучи солдатом в Ираке. И все же столкновение солдата с нигилизмом отдает фашизмом начала ХХ века, напоминая нам о таких авторах, как Эрнст Юнгер и т.п., которые видели в героическом конфликте способ восстановить утраченный élan; подобный подход грозит поставить перед экологическим движением весьма суровые цели.

Больший интерес представляет тщательное философское картографирование смерти. Исследование такого рода уже было проделано в виде разметки «трех смертей» — смерти бога, смерти человека и смерти мира [Flaxman 2012: 302—307]. Смерть бога наиболее известна в связи с декларациями Ницше, который заметил, что религия больше не предоставляет нам оснований для метафизической стабильности, которую некогда обеспечивала. Но, как он утверждает в параграфе 108 «Веселой науки», несмотря на то что бог умер, его образ будет сохраняться еще тысячелетиями. Предвосхищая способ, которым науку будет преследовать эта тень (о чем и свидетельствует Гея), Ницше заметил, что современный научный аналог веры в бога — это вера во вселенную как живое существо: «Мы ведь знаем приблизительно, что такое органическое: так неужели все невыразимо производное, позднее, редкостное, случайное, что только мы ни воспринимаем на земной коре, нам следует перетолковывать в терминах существенного, всеобщего, вечного, как это делают те, кто называет вселенную организмом? Мне это противно» [Ницше 2014: § 109]. Это все еще антропоморфизация природы! Фуко развивает аргумент Ницше, заявляя о смерти человека, и этот жест красноречиво воспроизводит Зилинская в книге «Конец человека». В «Словах и вещах» Фуко утверждает:

Это было не избавлением от давнего беспокойства, не выходом из тысячелетней заботы к ясности осознания, не подступом к объективности того, что так долго было достоянием веры или философии, — это было результатом изменения фундаментальных диспозиций знания. Человек, как без труда показывает археология нашей мысли, — это изобретение недавнее. И конец его, быть может, недалек [Фуко 1994: 404].

Чтобы разобраться с тезисом Фуко, нам следует задаться вопросом: насколько продуктивен дискурс, связанный с эффектом обзора? Помогла ли «идентификация человеческого места во вселенной» рассеять старые иллюзии, демистифицировать привычные разделения и объединить нас как вид? Конечно, это общераспространенный нарратив, ретранслируемый сценаристами и другими специалистами по мифотворчеству. Предпосылкой такого объединения, как правило, становится внезапное появление внешней силы (чаще всего — вторжение инопланетной формы жизни), причем настолько ужасающей, что люди не способны поступить иначе, кроме как забыть о своих различиях и объединиться, дабы устранить угрозу. Однако этот рефрен мы повсюду встречаем и в реальном мире, будь то объединение перед лицом атомной угрозы взаимного уничтожения, ядерной зимы, разрушения озонового слоя, химического оружия, нефтяных выбросов и еще многих других обещанных нам бедствий. Вполне очевидно, что алармистские заявления о неминуемом конце человечества отнюдь не подталкивают большую часть населения планеты к активным действиям. Хотя все это уже давным-давно понятно марксистам и другим материалистам, методы которых позволяют продемонстрировать, что угроза — вроде той, что связана с климатическими изменениями, — исходит не столько от коллективного невежества, сколько от влияния властных капиталистических интересов [Malm 2016].

Если мы хотим придумать свежую концовку для антропоцена, самое время подумать о новой смерти, — смерти этого мира. Мести Медеи. Речь не о том, чтобы нигилистски пожертвовать природой, но, скорее, о том, чтобы отомстить за предательство. Жестокие импульсы Медеи говорят о чем-то куда более сильном, чем то, что мы видим в предложенном Стенгерс образе: ее Гея настолько примордиальна, что сохраняет безразличие к людям до тех пор, пока раздражение не спровоцирует ее на действия. Тогда как неотъемлемая черта характера Медеи — жестокость. Ярость Медеи можно трактовать как женскую месть за мужское вероломство. В этом смысле ее история дополняет предложенный Зилинской «феминистский контрапокалипсис», который, в свою очередь, возвращает нас к старому революционному торгу: чем нам пожертвовать, чтобы создать условия для нового мира? Если вспомнить об umwelt’е Якоба фон Икскюля или о среде Жоржа Кангилема, можно сказать, что жизнь есть решение проблемы, поставленной миром. Следует пояснить: принципиально важно спасти природный мир. Куда менее очевидным остается то, что человеческий мир также заслуживает спасения. Дело, впрочем, заключается в том, чтобы признать, что изъян находится не в нас, а в нашем мире. Только тогда мы сможем использовать суицидальный импульс Медеи, чтобы подтолкнуть самих себя не к концу жизни, а всего лишь к концу нашего нынешнего образа жизни. Тогда смерть этого мира послужит моделью для революционной игры: отпустив все, что делает этот мир таким, каков он есть, мы унаследуем новый набор проблем. Однако для начала следует повернуться спиной к любому, кто говорит, что мы должны спасти этот мир.

Эндрю Калп

Антропоцен исчерпан: три возможные концовки

Опубликовано в журнале НЛО, номер 4, 2019

Land’s theory of technocapitalism

 In the early nineties, Land found a more concrete model for enacting death’s transcendental critique of anthropocentrism through the dynamics of technocapitalism. Here, Land radicalizes and retools Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of capitalism in Anti-Oedipus as a ‘deterritorialising’ process tending towards a ‘body without organs’. For Deleuze and Guattari, human individuals ought to be modelled on machines insofar as both are composed of parts or ‘organs’, which produce different functions or desires. Society, too, is constituted by a ‘territorialisation’ or ‘coding’ of the social body for the generation of society’s desires. Given, however, that every society’s territorialisation excludes certain desires from the given codes in favour of satisfying other desires, socialchange always threatens to disrupt the socius by ‘decoding’ or ‘deterritorialising’ the accepted codes through the introduction of new flows of desire. In particular, Deleuze and Guattari envision capitalism as the ultimate deterritorialising society hitherto. Since capitalism is organized around production for production’s sake, it ‘liberates’ the serf as a ‘free’ worker and goods through money’s universal equivalent, thereby abstracting them from any stable code of desires such that they can be forever deterritorialised anew. Through this abstraction or ‘axiomatization’, capitalism tends towards what Deleuze and Guattari call, following Artaud, the ‘body without organs (BwO)’ without determinate functions and codifications of desire: ‘[capitalism] created an axiomatic of abstract quantities that keeps moving further and further in the direction of the deterritorialisation of the socius. Capitalism tends toward a threshold of decoding that will destroy the socius in order to make it a body without organs’. By the same token, Deleuze and Guattari qualify that, since capitalism can only organise the desiring and social processes of production through the family and State institutions, it still depends on a certain territorialisation without which society would simply break down. It is not so much capitalism, then, but societal collapse, chaos, madness and death that Deleuze and Guattari identify with the ‘full’ body without organs: ‘the full body without organs is the unproductive, the sterile, the ungendered, the unconsumable. […] The death instinct: that is its name.’ In the final analysis, then, the body without organs is only capitalism’s regulative ideal after which it strives without ever attaining it. It is at this juncture in Anti-Oedipus that Land intervenes to modify Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of capitalism in two crucial respects. On the one hand, since Land sees humanity’s annihilation as a solution to accessing the real rather than as a problem as it is for Deleuze and Guattari, he affirms that we should actively strive to become bodies without organs, not even if it kills us, but precisely because it kills us. On the other hand, Land adopts Anti-Oedipus’ conception of capitalism as a radically deterritorialising machine while ignoring their caveat that capitalism also reterritorialises and recodes. On the contrary, for Land, capitalism is nothing other than the absolute deterritorialisation of the full body without organs, which was only ever a regulative ideal on Deleuze and Guattari’s reading:

Machinic desire can seem a little inhuman, as it rips up political cultures, deletes traditions, dissolves subjectivities, and hacks through security apparatuses, tracking a soulless tropism to zero control. This is because what appears to humanity as the history of capitalism is an invasion from the future by an artificial  intelligent space that must assemble itself entirely from its enemy’s resources.

Whereas we shall see that Brassier will charge Land with anthropomorphising the real as per the dynamics of human (capitalist) society, for Land, capitalism is not a human, and hence contemptible process. Rather, capitalism embodies the thoughtless real itself as it tends towards the destruction of the human species. We can already discern from the previous citation that Land specifically sees capitalism as deterritorialising anthropoid codes through its constant technological onslaught. Where Brassier will focus on the natural sciences and particularly cosmology, Land takes his cue from AI researchers like I.J. Good and Vernor Vinge to make the case that we will soon create strong AI, which is so much smarter than ourselves that it will ultimately do away with us for slowing down its runaway process of exponential intelligence explosion as we employ it to execute our petty human needs. While these AI researchers seek to warn us of the coming AI threat, Land actually encourages that we acquiesce to our imminent extinction at the hands of a technospecies of our own making, so as to facilitate their runaway process of absolute deterritorialisation:

It might still be a few decades before artificial intelligences surpass the horizon of biological ones, but it is utterly superstitious to imagine that the human dominion of terrestrial culture is still marked out in centuries, let alone in some metaphysical perpetuity. The high road to thinking no longer passes through a deepening of human cognition, but rather through a becoming inhuman of cognition.

On Land’s reading, AI must not be mistaken for immortal humans; on the contrary, AI will be of such a superior intelligence to humans that their thinking is literally inconceivable to us. Like death, then, AI marks the transcendental  horizon beyond which we cannot think, thereby throwing our pretentions to exhaust the cosmos through our conceptual cages into radical doubt: ‘what lies beyond is not merely difficult to imagine, it is absolutely inconceivable. Attempting to picture or describe it is a ridiculous futility’; and: ‘nothing human makes it out of the near[1]future’. If the technological singularity satisfies Land’s goal, it is because it will annihilate the human race by way of an intelligence that is not hampered by anthropocentric egocentricities, which can thus think the real, and evdeterritorialising dynamics. Since Land always identifies the real with the death of humankind, the fact that the singularity will wipe us out is no reason to prevent or fear its day of judgment, but in fact all the more reason to strive towards it.

The dark enlightenment

In his recent writings, Land’s commitment to capitalism as the subject of transcendental critique has led him to tactically align himself with the far right’s largely online ‘neoreactionary’ tendency. In his now infamous ‘Dark Enlightenment’ piece (2012), Land rails against Western democratic societies for being too short-sighted and anthropocentric. That is to say, democracy’s reliance on temporary caretaker politicians who must appeal to public opinion every few years to be re-elected incentivizes them to focus on short-term goals like satiating the populace’s petty and parochial desires and needs. If Land laments democracy’s all-too-human gratification of public opinion, it is because such short-sightedness renounces the pursuit of long[1]term future goals like technological innovation: ‘the democratic virus burns through society, painstakingly accumulated habits and attitudes of forward-thinking, prudential, human and industrial investment, are replaced by a sterile, orgiastic consumerism, financial incontinence, and a “reality television” political circus’. On Land’s account, democracy amounts to ‘looting the future’, the unknown and the inconceivable, in favor of a pure, anthropoid present of ‘techno-industrial retardation’.

THE DECLINE OF POLITICS IN THE NAME OF SCIENCE? CONSTELLATIONS AND COLLISIONS BETWEEN NICK LAND AND RAY BRASSIER

Vincent Le

Here is Bataille’s version of le demier homme (Bataille reading a portrait

of Hegel as an old man):

I imagine seeing exhaustion, the horror of being in the depths of things – of

being God. Hegel, at the moment when the system closed, believed himself

for two years to be going mad: perhaps he was afraid of accepting evilwhich

the system justifies and renders necessary; or perhaps linking the certainty

of having attained absolute knowledge with the completion of history-

he saw himself, in a profound sense, becoming dead; perhaps even

his various bouts of sadness took shape in the more profound horror of being

God.

This is the face of a Hegel on the verge of the inner experience, which is

what occurs when everything possible has been actualized, when nothing

remains but impossibility (nothing further can happen: history, like art, is

vergangen, all horizons have been surpassed – the Aufhebung has done

everything one can ask of it). Blanchot, writing on Bataille, comments:

“The interior experience insists upon this event that does not belong to

possibility; it opens in this already achieved being an infinitesimal interstice

by which all that is suddenly allows itself to be exceeded, deposed by

an addition that escapes and goes beyond [un surcroft qui echappe et excede

] . A strange surplus” ‘ A surplus of the negative, there

being nothing left to negate. A surplus that Hegel (as Bataille imagines

him) experiences in the form of a looming madness, an approaching horror

of being God, on a negative theologian’s theory of being God where being

such is existence without being – a mystical (that is, absolutely negative)

experience: “The experience of non-experience,” Blanchot calls it

 (Just think of it! God: an absolute surplus of negativity; or,

the death of God – as God imagines it. It would have to be a death that

went on forever.)

“What is a philosopher?,” Blanchot asks in “Connaissance de l’inconnu”;

and he answers, “borrowing words from Georges Bataille, it is

someone who is afraid”: afraid of the Outside, of the limit-experience,

of what remains irreducible to knowledge, of that which remains

unknown when knowledge has no further progress to make, of an existence

which, being without being, that is, not being the existence of this or

that being, is being that cannot be negated. As Blanchot explains in his essay

on Bataille: “Interior experience is the manner in which the radical

negation that no longer has anything to negate is affirmed”

(To be sure: “This has the air of a joke. But if we will grant that all modern

humanism, the work of science, and planetary development have as their

object a dissatisfaction with what is, and thus the desire to transform being

– to negate it in order to derive power from it and to make of this

power to negate the infinite movement of human mastery – then it will become

apparent that this sort of weakness of the negative, and the way in

which nothingness masks itself in the being that cannot be negated, lays

waste at one stroke to our attempts to dominate the earth and to free ourselves

from nature by giving it a meaning – by denaturing it”

Imagine therefore a time when the dialectic has overcome everything,

which means a time that has ceased to progress, a time without

progress or without a future (corresponding to a space without horizon):

call it a stop-time or “end of history” when everything has been accomplished

or fulfilled.

The difficulty is that for Blanchot temporality does not coincide with

history but exceeds it, interminably, as if at the end of history we were “delivered

over to another time”  (“What remains after the system

– the naught left over, still to be expended – is the push of dying in its

repetitive novelty” . In his essay on Bataille Blanchot asks

us to imagine living our lives twice, once according to the time of the possible

“as something we comprehend, grasp, bear, and master . . . by relating

it to some good or to some value” -some end or purpose; and another

according to an impossible, anarchic time or “time as something that escapes

all employment and all end, and more, as that which escapes our

very capacity to undergo it, but whose trial we cannot escape. Yes, as

though impossibility, that by which we are no longer able to be able, were

waiting for us behind all that we live, think, and say”.

The moral is (once more) that “possibility is not the sole dimension of our

existence”

Picture therefore Hegel sitting for the portrait that Bataille interprets.

This would be Hegel as the last man (a “Hegel living: the travesty of a

completed Meaning”) that is, Hegel passive and waiting

with nothing left to wait for: Hegel no longer coinciding with himself,

en detour to a nonrelation, becoming a visage without site or perspective,

framed by exteriority, thinking mad, Nietzsche-like thoughts (the only

thoughts left to think: “Nothing ends, everything begins again”;

 “There is nothing identical except for the fact that everything returns”

 By rights, or in keeping with the unitary rigor of

philosophy, Hegel ought not to have allowed himself to be turned into a

portrait (“Hegel the impostor”. In the event, availing himself

in this fashion, he opened a window in the history of reason, turned

himself into a presence that is no longer present: slipped, so to speak, into

the Outside. So it is not surprising that, on Bataille’s reading, fear is written

on Hegel’s face.

Maurice Blanchot – The Refusal of Philosophy

Gerald L. Bruns

Writing is forsakenness: being forsaken (not by others, says Kafka, but

by oneself) : carried away by a worldless existence, inhabiting- no, not inhabiting,

being lost, being at a loss, wandering in a place that is not a

world. Better to call it a space without a world: a placeless space, a surface

across which one is dispersed, no longer a resident of oneself but dispossessed,

turned out of oneself, identifying oneself with errancy, separation,

drift. “Wandering in the Wilderness” becomes Kafka’s watchword.  Blanchot

refers to this as “the Abraham perspective” (ELS2/SL7o). In “How to

Read Abraham?” Blanchot reads Kafka’s Diaries (particularly the entries

from 1922) as a document of this perspective, summarized by Kafka’s

remark: “I live elsewhere” (29 January 1922: Diaries, p. 409) , where elsewhere

is not a private, interior, subjective space: not an imaginary space, a

dreamworld, nor is it a place set part on the model of aesthetic differentiation:

a museumlike preserve free from the claims of knowledge. Rather it

is a place where these claims have been superseded by the claim of writing

itself.

This place is where art is. Art neither dreams nor creates, nor does it describe

things either true or imaginary. What is true has no need for art; it is

a plenum. The true exhausts everything that is. The same is true of the

imaginary (in either its Aristotelian or Sartrean versions), which pours itself

into every vacuum, exhausts every absence, consumes it with its power

of possibility. But the world of art is the nonidentical; that is, in a world in

which things are recognizable, identifiable, self-identical, part of language,

“there is no place for art” (EL89!SL75)’

For art is linked, precisely as Kafka is, to what is “outside” the world [ “hors”

du monde 1, and it expresses the profundity of this outside [dehors 1 bereft of

intimacy and repose – this outside which appears when even with ourselves,

even with our death, we no longer have relations of possibility. Art is the

consciousness of this “misfortune.” It describes the situation of one who has

lost himself, who can no longer say “me,” who in the same movement has

lost the world, the truth of the world, and belongs to exile, to the time of distress

when, as Htilderlin says, the gods are no longer and are not yet. This

does not mean that art affirms another world, at least not if it is true that art

has its origin, not in another world, but in the other of all worlds. (EL89-90/

SL7S)

Art is a “movement outside the true” [demarche hors du vrai]” (EL92!

SL77) . It neither dreams nor creates – it demands. In this event the writer

experiences art as an incapacitation, a pure passivity, insomnia, waiting,

dying- “not death, alas, but the eternal torment of dying” (Diaries, p.

302). This is a demand which presupposes, not the possibility of action,

but its impossibility: a demand that exacts a useless patience. Kafka calls

it, Beckett-like, the “old incapacity” (Diaries, p. 33).

Maurice Blanchot

The Refusal of Philosophy

Gerald L. Bruns

The French philosopher Alain Badiou (2020), after specifying that this epidemic is nothing new or extraordinary, adds: “we know that the world market, combined with the existence of vast under-medicalized zones and the lack of global discipline when it comes to the necessary vaccinations, inevitably produces serious and devastating epidemics.” And he goes on to say that “the planetary diffusion of this point of origin [Wuhan]” is “borne by the capitalist world market and its reliance on rapid and incessant mobility.” He is hinting that epidemics due to the worldwide (capitalist) market are completely different from those that spread in pre-capitalist times! This is of course quite absurd. I wonder what the link is between the existence of medically under-served zones (which exist of course, especially in Africa) and the origin and spread of Covid-19. What is puzzling is that Wuhan is by no means an under-medicalized zone (in fact, the Chinese response to the epidemic was highly effective) and the virus first spread in the wealthiest parts of the world, where the health system is quite efficient. In fact, Marxist philosophers must be evoking all of these problems (the capitalist market, poor areas, etc.) as if reciting a litany, as a conditioned reflex, even if these problems have no clear connection with other kinds of ills we are dealing with.

Badiou, like others, is evidently mixing up modernization and capitalism. By modernization I  mean the expansion of technology and the application of scientific discoveries within society, a process that has historically coincided with the development of capitalism but does not necessarily identify with the latter. I wonder whether the anti-capitalism of so many actually conceals simply a rejection of modern technological society, a somewhat regressive aspiration.

The limit of every ideology – therefore also of the neo-Marxist or neoanarchist ones I am targeting here – is trying to force anything that happens into a predetermined framework. Of course, theories are indispensable to simplify the chaotic complexity of the world, but they always risk being a bed of Procrustes onto which reality is forced. Some refuse to admit that reality can refute or relativize their theories and will always come up with ways to find their ideas confirmed. Many academic “critical theories” lack any critical spirit. An epidemic, whether it was the plague, or cholera, and so on, used to be interpreted as a divine punishment for human sins. Today, instead, an intellectual elite interprets an epidemic as a punishment that human beings inflict upon themselves. Many think that “nature rebels against humans”. Nature has taken the place of God as the punisher. But for others, Homo sapiens ruin themselves for the sin of having generated capitalistic societies.

Sergio Benvenuto June 1, 2020

СМЪРТТА е абстракция, твърде материалистическа може би, но по-скоро сингулярен свършек на сингулярна мирова точка, причудлива и неприобщена като планетата Планемо, извън хегелианските синтези, суперпозициониране на сингулярни точки извън идентичност и смисъл, извън заедност (каква противна дума за Цветан), по-скоро ефект на нелокалност извън негентропичните граматики, извън още по-жалките идеологически интерпелации, и нищо чудно ако само егоцентриците се окажат завършени алтруисти в това преливане на светове с илюзията за подреденост, по-скоро периодичност на хаоса (човекът е периодическо животно, Ницше), където този „исторически” свят е квантово неразположен и компрометиран, и произходът му е задължен на каламбури, в нелингвистичната сърцевина на невъзможно-Реалното, и там нищо не заслужава да бъде отслужвано в категорични императиви, too late to be legal, и в стоическа абстиненция чашата на масата прелива празна, както празният говор разобличава пълното говорене на християнски, комунистически и демократични аватари и псевдо-Спасители, самонаели се да изпият съдбовната чаша, която не съществува, освен в имагинерните им нарцисизми, и именно Цветан, последният егоцентрик на Последната вечеря, с проникновените си критики отваря път, за да го затвори, в безкрайния травматизъм на самодеструктивни светове с отсъстващи детерминанти и залози.

Златомир Златанов

ЦВЕТАН МАРАНГОЗОВ

(1933-2021)

Nichtiger Grund des nichtigen Entwurfs

Цветане, сбогом

It seems that we must eventually learn to live in a world with untrustworthy replicators. One sort of tactic would be to hide behind a wall or run away. But these are brittle methods: dangerous replicators might breach the wall or cross the distance, and bring disaster. And, though walls can be made proof against small replicators, no fixed wall can be made proof against large-scale, organized malice. We will need a more robust, flexible approach … seems that we can build nanomachines that act somewhat like the white blood cells of the human immune system: devices that can fight not just bacteria and viruses, but dangerous replicators of all sorts.

Gibson, Neuromancer

ЛЪВОВ МОСТ

Висиш на Лъвов мост

И как метафората ще  развиеш

Поднесена  е наготово

В метонимия звънтяща

На трамвайни релси

Историята мародерства

Под хълбока на Сердика

С оглозган камък

Всеядно стилизира

Липсата на стил

В ликвидни мизансцени

Руините орнаментира

Как мислиш

Може би реликви

Или пък франчайз

Или джентрификация

На  сувенирни медальони

Стоиш на моста

лъв император роб

лайф-стайлинговани фланьори

на реминисцентна Ulpia

балкански нобели

на мракобесие

под форма на емпатия

Как мислиш

Се лекува подаграта

С горещата вода

На  минерали

До репликата на хотел Максим

неаполинерно

Реката се изтичаше под моста

И  в кафене The Bridge

На островния тротоар

Си сменяха местата

Мостови клиенти

На разпадаща се темпоралност

поради липсата

на обективно време

Как мислиш

Дали все още

отсреща в сградата

пред  срутване на Гешев

(с предпазни тенти)

Стражарите играят

на ашици

С протезното   изкуствено око

на   Гео Милев

But what of suicide, which is simply a quickening of  a mandatory death? Death is an anti-teleology, to wait only for more nothingness. For there cannot be a final nothingness, one which could find any less or more meaning  than there has been up until now, there has been nothing  all along, and death shall alter nothing too. And so I found in the possibility of suicide nothing more than there was already, a decision of the same. Cioran said, “a book is a suicide postponed.” (A Methodology of Possession. On the Philosophy of Nick Land, James Ellis, 2020).

Вместо Чоран тук  Елис в новата си впечатляваща книга трябваше да цитира Бланшо, от когото Чоран очевидно е почерпил вдъхновение.

И тъй като не го прави, ще го направя аз.

To write one’s autobiography, in order either to confess or to engage in self-analysis or in order to expose oneself to the gaze of all, in the manner of a work of art, is perhaps to seek to survive, but through a perpetual suicide—total  insofar as fragmentary death. To write (of) oneself is to cease to be, in order to confide in a guest/host – the other, a reader—who will  henceforth have as charge and  as life nothing but your inexistence ( Maurice Blanchot).